| Good gracious.. |
[Sep. 5th, 2006|11:07 am] |
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Have I been away so long? Prepare for more LJ pleasure my simplistic friends. |
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| (no subject) |
[Aug. 1st, 2006|11:10 am] |
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jeffery bernard remains unwell |
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| Vileness |
[Jun. 26th, 2006|10:49 pm] |
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Jeffery Bernard is unwell. |
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| Worst Philosophy Book |
[Jun. 23rd, 2006|10:15 am] |
Consciousness explained/Daniel Dennett.
A must for those who enjoy myriad examples of neurology not quite backing up the argument he attempts.
Perhaps he's an excellent psychology professor? |
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| In Answer. |
[Jun. 22nd, 2006|08:42 am] |
If the term 'matter' can encompass stones, sand, grass, hats and consciousness and intention, then as a term it seems to become so all embracing as to become useless. We might say, "all is matter" but if i ask you, pointing by stages to a rock, to a hat, to a brain, then to expressions of mind, what each in essence is, and you answer "matter" then i dont know that i learn very much.
To say "all is matter" is to say "matter is all", they are interchangeable terms. They are synonyms. I could equally say, "all is all" or even "matter is matter." But put it like that and you can easily see that i'm not really telling you very much at all.
Indeed, with the statement "all is matter" i'm only really saying anything of any content if i'm opposing it to a dualist position or to a doctrine of transcendence. That is, by stating that "all is matter" i'm really saying "there is nothing else that is ontologically different to what we call matter; there is only one way of being." In other words, the statement only serves to impart something resembling definite information if i say it in the context of what have largely been disputes within metaphysical and religious arguments.
The problem for you and Searle, i'd argue, is that the real argument lies not in questions of the identity or not of mind and brain but in the nature of matter. However, as soon as anyone ventures in that direction they'll find themselves having to posit a hierarchy of forms or systems of matter. And, this will mean they'll have to start thinking about what allows "matter" to be one state of being while being of the nature of a continuity of different and distinct and irreducible systems. What is it that is common to third person and first person matter?
Now, this question means that what is essential to matter will be something that cannot be arrived at empirically, for first person subjective matter is not able to be observed in the same way as third person objective matter. Yet both are material, thus what is essential, which is to say that which applies across the board to all matter, must be 'deeper', or 'before', or 'above', empirical observation. And, as what is essential is also essential to first person subjective matter, then it must be the foundation of all sensory perception, of all empirical research, and all reflection on such.
In other words, the only way we could get at the essence of matter, the only way to formulate a credible doctrine on matter, and thus set about formulating a philosophy of consciousness proper (and thereby of perception and free will), must be through the discipline of metaphysics. But metaphysics is exactly what Searle and many others following the rise to dominance of empiricism, want to avoid. |
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fatgoff's journal